



THE LONELINESS OF TWO LONG-DISTANCE 









Questo articolo è un’indagine di quanto gli scritti del noto sociologo, antropologo, 
storico e filosofo  Ernest Gellner (1925-1995) si prestino come strumento critico 
per i testi letterari in genere, e due testi di Giorgio Bassani (1916-2000) in 




Ernest Gellner had too many ideas for us to go into too much depth here. 
In his last book, Language and Solitude, the central theme in the first half 
of his work is a discussion of the battle between what he terms 
“rationalistic individualism” and “romantic communalism”. He sees these 
two rival notions as pivotal in trying to understand modernity. He views 
the appeal of Gesellschaft (Society), i.e. a situation that enshrines the 
individual and his or her rights and responsibilities and Gemeinschaft 
                                                 
*  L’articolo è stato presentato come seminario alle università di Edimburgo e Oxford il 5 e 9 marzo 




(Community), i.e. a situation that enshrines the rights and responsibilities 
of the community before that of the individual as oppositional:  
 
There are two fundamental theories of knowledge. These two 
theories stand in stark contrast to each other. They are 
profoundly opposed. They represent two poles of looking, 
not merely at knowledge, but at human life. (1998:3) 
 
By this he is referring to another, more abstract definition of these terms, 
namely the “atomistic” and the “organic” views of the world. We may 
find these ideas old hat; we may agree or disagree or find a host of reasons 
why his view of the world may be considered absurdly reductive, or even 
far too simplistic, but a starting point it certainly is as a way of trying to 
unravel the world we live in and how it has come to be what it is. The 
question that intrigues is: can such a view of the world find application to 
a literary text, and if so which texts are best suited to what has been called 
a Gellnerian vision? As a student of comparative literature, it behoves one 
to look at how seemingly unrelated disciplines can shed light on a literary 
text. To do so may appear contrived, stilted  – surely a text can speak for 
itself if it is worthwhile? 
 Anna Karenina is still a good read without cluttering it with jargon. 
But it is thanks to novels such as this and many others, let’s say about 19th 
century Russia, that we have some idea of what life was like in those 
times. The same applies for Ivan Turgenev, or for Fascist Italy Ignazio 
Silone, or Louisa May Alcott or Mark Twain or J.M. Coetzee. They can 
be seen as windows on a particular society at a given time. As soon as we 
dip into that way of thinking we then think, well maybe an idiosyncratic 
thinker such as Ernest Gellner might be useful beyond his professed 
disciplines of philosophy, social anthropology, and history as a way of 
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looking at literature. After all, don’t novels also shed light on philosophy, 
social anthropology and history? Literature is not a one-way street1. 
 So why Bassani? What one is endeavouring to do is to experiment, as 
if to say, let’s look over the fence of literary theory, or national literatures 
and start digging and see what we can find. This has been done before. All 
one is doing now is to see to what extent, if at all, Gellner can help us to 
illuminate a text such as Gli occhiali d’oro or Il giardino dei Finzi-
Contini, – henceforth referred to as Gli occhiali and Il giardino for 
brevity’s sake – the one a novella, the other a fully fleshed novel of 
Tolstoyan proportions. 
 Ernest Gellner was arguably one of the more controversial thinkers of 
his age, praised and often condemned for views that went against the 
current of many a received wisdom of his time. He was a philosopher, 
sociologist, anthropologist and an historian. He is best known for his 
works such as Book, Plough and Sword, Words and Things, Legitimation 
of Belief, Language and Solitude, not to mention possibly his best known 
text, Nations and Nationalism. 
 To briefly introduce Gellner’s works, suffice it to say that they are 
steeped in a deep understanding of the effects of historical forces, 
historical forces that he was often fated to live through.  Born in Paris, he 
grew up in Czechoslovakia, and we can all imagine the intimate 
experience he had of the ideological whirlwinds that held sway in Europe 
during his lifetime. 
 To understand Gellner in the broadest terms, the introductory note of 
his Postmodernism, Reason and Religion should be read: 
 
                                                 
1  See M. Hanne, The Power of the Story – Fiction and Political Change, Oxford, Berghahn Books, 
1996:34 et seq. 
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On questions of faith, Ernest Gellner believes, three 
ideological options are open to us today. One is a return to a 
genuine and firm faith in a religious tradition. The other is a 
form of relativism which abandons the notion of unique truth 
altogether, and resigns itself to treating truth as relative to the 
society of culture in question. The third, which Gellner calls 
enlightenment rationalism, upholds the idea that there is a 
unique truth, but denies that any society can ever possess it 
definitively. (Introduction to Postmodernism, Reason and 
Religion, 1992:i) 
 
This third option is the most compelling when looking at Bassani, (who 
died relatively recently in 2000).  
The question is not whether we agree with everything Gellner has to 
say, when he speaks as a social anthropologist, or anything he has to say 
for that matter about the rise of modernity, Reason or the rise of 
individuality, but rather whether his modus operandi, the questions he 
asks and the way he asks them that can be of use to us in analysis specific 
literary texts.   
While Gellner had a lot to say about how societies came about, how 
the coming into being of modernity was not inevitable, the aspect one is 
concentrating on is his vision of individualism and what has been 
described as his Rationalist Fundamentalism2. Predictably, Gellner 
abhorred what he considered “closed systems” and was a champion of the 
“liberal polity”.   
Gellner laid great stress on the rise of individualism as a sine qua non 
of modernity and on ideas of truth and knowledge, which led him to the 
conclusion that the search for truth is essentially a solitary activity. Of 
                                                 
2  M. Buchowski,  “The Social Condition of Knowledge: Gellner and the Postmodernist Menace” 
in Social Evolution and History, Summer 2003, Volume 2, Number 2:34-54. 
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course, the nigh naïve idea of “searching for truth” is anthropocentric, but 
the introduction to Postmodernism, Reason and Religion specifically says 
“On questions of faith”, and in a sense that is what we’re dealing with 
here. The faith that we might be able to discern some elements that give 
us a better understanding of the world – and in our case, a closer 
understanding of some literary texts. By way of summary one should add 
that Gellner maintains that humanity progressed through what he saw as 
the three stages of human development, namely hunter-gatherer to agraria 
to industria.  This was Gellner’s way of trying to understand the 
emergence of the modern world as we have it today. And he was not alone 
in this approach, but cardinal to his thinking is that while the industrial 
age emerged out of the Enlightenment, in doing so created a world – that 
in having separated the social, religious and the political – devoid of 
comfort, solace or meaning. 
The “cosy habitat” as he terms it, is not to be found in a world where 
the institutions of state, economics, religion and family have been so 
thoroughly separated. 
While many critics have discussed the limitations of Gellner’s view, 
presented here inevitably in a reductive fashion, the main criticism is that 
his “Trinitarian” (hunter-gather-agraria-industria) view is too limiting and 
excludes the unpredictable as well as those elements which arise out of 
history spontaneously. We get closer to our goal of understanding Bassani 
when Gellner says:  
 
Above all, society never constitutes an authority or a 
vindication. If society itself, or some institution within it, 
makes such a claim, then that is a usurpation and to be 
strenuously resisted. Society has no right to impose its 
authority either on inquiry or on its outcome. Neither its 
views, nor its outcome is authoritative. Truth stands outside 
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and above, it cannot be under social or political control. 
Legitimation of ideas by authority, by consensus, or the 
social creation of truth, is an abomination. (1998:3)  
 
In Gli occhiali, we see how – as per Gellner – the gradual invasion of the 
state’s version of the truth makes inroads into, and ultimately determines 
personal lives. The state ceases to be an abstract concept and the author 
consciously, layer by layer, peels away the elements that divide the 
personal from the political, and ultimately the personal becomes political.  
We witness in Gli occhiali the coming of age of our protagonist, his moral 
consciousness develops and he is faced with choices between right and 
wrong, between acquiescing and compromising with the state, as his 
father does in Il giardino, or taking a stance that puts him in a precarious 
position, but ultimately exemplifies his defiance and freedom, both 
artistically and as an individual. 
It is Gellner’s notion of individuality and the emergence of cognition, 
i.e. the emancipation from the religious or the transcendental, on an 
anthropological level, that coincides with Bassani’s io narrante 
protagonist who becomes aware of what he is, morally, socially, 
politically and how these express themselves in ethical terms. We are 
moving to the creation of what, in Gellner’s terms, is the “atomistic” 
individual. 
The various strands of cognition, of social, political, historical 
awareness further manifest themselves in Bassani’s use of language and 
his use of language as a transmitter of knowledge. Bassani’s language 
reinforces the idea of language as a way of reinforcing continuity, amidst 
a situation in which continuity is imperilled. In effect, we are dealing with 
a situation where continuity cannot be taken for granted and the artistic 
expression thus becomes the guarantor of continuity, where continuity can 
 
 30 
no longer to be relied upon as in the case of the Jewish community of 
Ferrara that feels its institutions under threat. Continuity of the community 
can no longer be guaranteed under Fascism, no matter what compromises 
the community makes with the regime. Thus it comes as no surprise that 
Bassani introduces Il giardino thus: 
 
La tomba era grande, massiccia, proprio imponente: una 
specie di tempio, tra l’antico e l’orientale, come se ne vedeva 
nelle scenografie dell’Aïda e del Nabucco in voga nei nostri 
teatri d’opera fino a pochi anni fa. (1985:13)  
[The tomb was huge, solid and truly imposing, a kind of 
temple, something of a cross between the antique and the 
oriental, such as might be encountered in those stage sets of 
Aïda or Nabucco very much in vogue at our theatres only a 
few years back.] (McKendrick, 2007:7) 
 
The above quote illustrates the millennial views that Bassani also 
maintains, as if to relativise, diminuify the moment of history in which his 
tale in Il giardino unfolds. Moreover, significant too are the names of the 
Verdi operas with their Risorgimento and Old Testament echoes. Bassani 
seems to share with Gellner that legitimation of ideas by secular authority, 
by consensus, or the social creation of truth, is an abomination  (Gellner: 
1998) in that the state that was imposing its truth on society was itself an 
abomination, one that he could not identify with, even before the adoption 
of the Race Laws of 1938. (The inherent risk of the individual delegating 
to the state the responsibility for one’s own life is self-evident, but reflects 
the eternal dilemma of the relationship between the individual and the 
collective, between the individual and society). The emphasis on language 
and its function as a tool for continuity has been noted by many critics: 
 
 31
“The very act of naming objects defeats their death through the strong 
emotions that the “words” awaken” (Radcliff-Umstead, 1985:116-125). 
Words then, in the context of shifting values and a precarious ethical 
universe form part of a death-defying ritual, as a consequence of death’s 
immanence and omnipresence. Words in effect become part of what 
Gellner calls the “cosy habitat”; they are used to reflect the retreat into a 
world that continues to make sense, or at least reflect an attempt to make 
sense of the world, futile though doing so may appear to be. The “cosy 
habitat” is a term Gellner uses to describe the “organic” vision, the sense 
of community. In the case of Bassani we’re dealing with the recreation of 
an ephemeral cosy habitat, a return to the organic of sorts, the atomist 
returning to the organic, in the full knowledge that his “organic” realm is 
under threat from a rival organic view of the world, namely Fascism and 
the Race Laws.  
Inasmuch as language is a transmitter of values and knowledge, in 
Bassani language not only echoes and reinforces a notion of continuity – 
but becomes a device all the more valuable because of the precariousness 
of the times. In this regard Patrick Heady summarises Gellner’s 
observations about kinship and language: 
 
[…] The first component of the ideal language would be a 
system of labelling each individual’s relations to his or her 
ancestors so precisely that for any two members of the 
society it would become instantly clear from these labels 
(Gellner refers to them as ‘names’) what, if anything, the 
biological relationship between two individuals was…. 
Gellner compares these ‘names’ to coordinate references in 
physical space. They would make it possible to identify one 
aspect of the kinship relationship between (physical) descent 




We can clearly see in Bassani’s novels how his descriptions of Ferrara are 
used to this end. Radcliffe-Umstead goes further and puts it more 
succinctly when he says: 
  
The cluttered collection of opalines, like the beloved objects 
cited in the verses of the “twilight” poets, [I crepuscolari], 
represents the objective correlative about which both the 
narrator and the character Micòl summon forth images of the 
cosy comfort and traditional elegance of the young woman’s 
apartment” (Radcliff-Umstead: 1985). The very act of 
naming objects defeats their death through the strong 
emotions that the “words” awaken. (1985:116-125) 
 
In Bassani then, legitimation and continuity are conferred through the 
frequent and accurate references to spaces, moods, attitudes, time and 
objects, certainly not through the social creation of truth, i.e. Fascism or 
the state. We can see where Occhiali d’oro fits in on a Gellner’s scheme: 
Bassani’s io narrante would seem to embody the values of the 
Enlightenment as well as those of the Risorgimento, a patriotism of a 
liberal and democratic hue. In the novel the only would-be “cosy habitat” 
on a large scale is represented by Fascism, a “cosy habitat” that purported 
to provide solace for a nation from the rigours and falsehoods of 
modernity, only to replace it with another set of falsehoods. But on a more 
intimate level, the io narrante seeks also his “cosy habitat” in the self-
conscious knowledge that he is part of something more ancient than the 
transitory phenomenon of Fascism. His culture and religion, secular and 
Sephardic, have provided him as well with a set of values that he can seek 
and find solace; the tragic irony being that the source of his solace is also 
what condemns him in that fraught period in history. 
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Let’s consider again Gellner’s statement, from the last book he wrote, 
Language & Solitude 2 where he says right from the start: 
 
There are two fundamental theories of knowledge. These two 
theories stand in stark contrast to each other. They are 
profoundly opposed. They represent two poles of looking, 
not merely at knowledge, but at human life. Aligned with 
these two polar views of knowledge, there are also related, 
and similarly contrasted, theories of society, of man, of 
everything. This chasm cuts right across our total social 
landscape. (1998:3) 
 
This is how Gellner refers to the chasm between the “atomistic” view of 
the world and the “organic” view of the world. This is significant because 
knowledge, whether arrived at by ritual, observation or intuition, take on 
many forms and functions: 
 
What counts as “a philosopher” differs far more from country 
to country. Or even within them, than is the case for any 
another “subject”. Societies and cultures which do not differ 
radically in other respects, display extreme differences at this 
point, which would seem to suggest that the shared 
intellectual or social situation of our time does not of itself 
impose any single solution on us. (1979:14) 
 
Gli occhiali d’oro then in particular serves as a kind of crucible revealing 
the historical, philosophical and social anthropological elements at work 
in a given society. The novel ceases to be merely one about two outcasts, 
a homosexual and a Jew, finding each other and coming to some epiphany 
about the role of the individual in society. Gellner in this sense helps us to 
see that the novel has a resonance way beyond the immediate narrative. 
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We might know this already, be aware of the resonance the novel has 
without appealing to Gellner, but he gives us a useful vocabulary, a kind 
of ladder with which to look over the fence and articulate in other ways 
what we may already know through other theories or ways of looking at a 
text, or simply through a general knowledge of history. 
Our protagonist becomes progressively aware of the historical impasse 
in which he finds himself and becomes more aware of the ideals which he 
deems sacrosanct, but which he had hitherto taken for granted until they 
were challenged. Gli occhiali d’oro is at once a novel of doom and 
defiance, in that the protagonist makes a conscious choice not to be party 
to the demise; to be defiant and to bear witness to a later generation of the 
fate of Ferrara’s Jews, to be loyal to the ideals of the Risorgimento and to 
be a witness to the moral fragility and hypocrisy of his fellow Ferraresi. 
Significantly, Piero Pieri, quoting from Benedetto Croce’s Cultura e 
vita morale, makes the following observation and links Bassani clearly 
with philosophy by making reference to Benedetto Croce: 
 
Come Croce, anche Bassani vede nella morte degli ideali 
risorgimentali, a favore dei valori positivisti, i presupposti 
nefasti che indurranno la coscienza della nazione ad aderire 
al regime di Mussolini. [...] Croce ricorda non senza ironia 
che il positivismo è stato “l’espressione più schietta del 
movimento e degli interessi borghesi”. (2006:81) 
 
One of the greatest merits of Bassani’s oeuvre is that it provides – as do 
many other novels, but arguably none so intimately – a window into what 
one might call the “Fascist reality”. Unlike say Elio Vittorini, who relied 
heavily on symbolism, or Natalia Ginzburg, who was often oblique in her 
references to the “meta-narrative” of Fascism, in Bassani we have the 
steady encroachment of the meta-narrative into the realm of the personal, 
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into the intimate. (Of course, this applies most aptly in the creation of the 
enigmatic Micól, who as we know through the works of Marilyn 
Schneider, De Stefanis and Radcliff-Umstead and others, how she 
encapsulates doom, longing and fatalism and the notion of love that 
cannot flourish without a sense of future.) 
What is significant too is that Bassani’s approach does not limit us to 
that particular period in Italy’s history, but uses it to make observations 
about a universal dilemma, that of the individual vs. the collective, 
wherever, contrasting as he often does, the intimate with the universal, the 
moment in the individual’s life, with the moment in a society’s sense of 
itself. Thus, too, a linkage between him and Gellner is clear in that 
Bassani uses his narrative to explore patterns and underlying historical 
truths in a manner that echoes Gellner – they have similar preoccupations: 
both seek solace in a belief in Reason, in the values of the Enlightenment, 
and in doing so reflect a belief in a liberalism, something that has the 
potential to emancipate the individual from cultural or ethnic vagaries – a 
rationalism that is “supranational”, that functions as a bulwark against 
ethnic exclusivism, and vagaries of ethno-centricism, or what Gellner 
would term against the “village green”3. Cognition, in other words. 
(Gellner and others explore this idea more fully when discussing the crisis 
of liberalism in the Habsburg Empire, for example.) 
For Bassani the illusion that survival can be sought through a 
compromise with Fascism, with the truth generated by the state, is a 
survival inevitably tainted. The political and the ethical components are 
self-evident.  Betrayal on one level, against the purer ideals of the 
Risorgimento, betrayal of one principle, will lead to betrayal of a host of 
                                                 
3  “The village green stood against the Café Central of Vienna, or so it seemed” (Gellner, 1998:34). 
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others, thus making the enactment of the Race Laws of 1938 that much 
easier, almost inevitable: 
 
Truth stands outside and above, it cannot be under social or 
political control. Legitimation of ideas by authority, by 
consensus, or the social creation of truth, is an abomination. 
This vision is atomistic as well as individualistic. It not only 
makes the solitary individual a foreigner in his own world, 
separating him from it, requiring him to assert his 
independence; it also makes the part sovereign over the 
whole. (Gellner, 1998:3-4) 
 
We see how this view of truth, of cognition, in Gellner very much defines 
the io narrante in both novels. The io narrante does assert his 
independence, makes the “part sovereign over the whole”. We could then 
see how the io narrante’s behaviour in respect of Fadigati can be seen as 
one conforming to Gellner’s notion of the atomistic view of knowledge in 
that cognition goes beyond mere self-interest. The io narrante could have 
courted the friendship of Deliliers, could have ingratiated himself with 
Deliliers, yet he recognised that Deliliers’ behaviour towards Fadigati has 
parallels with that of the community towards Jews such as himself; and 
that a compromise with Deliliers, however advantageous it might seem in 
the short term, would ultimately be illusory and undignified. Association 
with Deliliers is ultimately no more than a question of buying time, of 
compromise, the kind of compromise we see the io narrante upbraiding 
his father for making with Fascism in Il giardino dei Finzi Contini. 
Furthermore, the individualism of the io narrante, his independent 
moral (“requiring him to assert his independence”) stance is accentuated 
by separating himself from both his fellow Jews who pretend things are 
not as menacing as they are, and from his non-Jewish peers, who he 
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knows will buckle under the pressure of the state to behave in way that 
conforms to the state’s notion of truth, inter alia the newly-found Anti-
Semitic milieu engendered by the state. Piero Pieri defines Bassani thus, 
in this regard, accentuating his “diversità”: 
 
La ‘diversità’ di Bassani parte proprio dal netto distacco nei 
confronti di ogni pietas ebraica, e diventa atto di razionalità 
storica proprio perché la Passeggiata [read Gli occhiali or Il 
giardino] è stata scritta dopo Buchenwald e Dachau. Quanti 
hanno parlato del semitismo di Bassani, non hanno 
considerato in modo adeguato il suo “anti-semitismo”; che 
non contiene la critica della razza, ma piuttosto, 
l’identificazione dell’ebreo con l’ala conservatrice della 
borghesia nazionale. Nell’antisemitismo di Bassani prevale, 
quindi, non la denuncia dell’ebreo come tipo, [Pieri’s italics] 
alla maniera di Weininger, ma della sua vanità di classe...  
(2006:68-69)  
 
The independent stance adopted by our io narrante, is asserted not only in 
respect of society in general, the spirit of his times, but also in respect of 
the very community, because of his adherence to which he is excluded 
from society at large. Marilena Renda places the emphasis as follows: 
 
Ecco allora lo sguardo simpatetico del narratore seguire i 
destini dei suoi personaggi nel loro procedere verso la fine, 
ed evocare i traumi della storia inseguendone gli echi e 
trascendendone i micro-frammenti di storie personali, in un 
interagire incessante tra destini personali e destini collettivi. 
(2006:128) 
 
We go on to see how the io narrante in Gli occhiali exemplifies what 




We explore the world by seeing actual patterns as contingent 
variants of deeper factors, and these we explore by 
rearranging actual patterns, in real or imaginary experiments. 
Freedom of experiment is analogous to freedom of trade, and 
each leads to growth in its own sphere, and the forms of 
freedom and consequent growth aid each other. Each is 
opposed to the imposition of hallowed rules or rigidities, 
whether based on tradition or revelation. (1998:5) 
 
Our io narrante becomes able through his growing awareness, to identify 
“variants of deeper factors”. He is not content with the way the world 
presents itself to him. He becomes aware of his difference; he is forced to 
become aware of something he had taken for granted, through the nascent 
Anti-Semitism in his society, as exemplified by the inimitable Signora 
Lavezzoli. He does indeed grow in his own sphere, and he finds himself in 
opposition “to the imposition of hallowed rules or rigidities”. 
Significantly Gellner adds, “whether based on tradition or revelation”, in 
other words, whether our protagonist’s awareness is fuelled by his Jewish 
tradition, by the political milieu, by expediency or by his own would-be 
independently arrived at view of the world: “[…] our real situation which 
involves choosing our forms of life, as best we can, and not treating them 
as ultimate” [italics Gellner’s] (1979:34). 
This aspect of how a reading of Gellner can elucidate a literary text 
can be viewed from a different angle when we recognise that what lies at 
the heart of our discussion is the nature of knowledge, how knowledge is 
arrived at and what vision knowledge represents and the political 
implications of knowledge. Or to use a word Gellner likes, “cognition”. 
Gellner, using his usual sources of Descartes, Kant, Durkheim and Weber, 
surmises that rationality cannot be viewed in isolation – and as conceived 
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as a way of arriving at truth – Gellner reminds us that: “Truth can be 
secured only by stepping outside prejudice and accumulated custom and 
refashioning the world. It can only be achieved by means of proudly, 
independent, solitary Reason. We pursue it rationally, and we do it alone” 
(1992:8). 
This is obviously a very contestable statement, if not joyously naïve, 
but the important point that he makes is that this truth is arrived at 
“alone”, is a solitary exercise, very much in the way the protagonists 
experience this in Bassani’s novels. Bassani’s protagonist in Gli occhiali, 
while other factors force him into an acknowledgement of certain truths, 
his cognition is such that he responds independently to the forces being 
enacted around him and on him; he doesn’t follow the herd, not even his 
own Jewish herd, he acknowledges the painful truth of his situation to 
himself. As we mentioned in the beginning: “enlightenment rationalism, 
upholds the idea that there is a unique truth, but denies that any society 
can ever possess it definitively” (Introduction to Postmodernism, Reason 
and Religion, 1992). The io narrante in Gli occhiali arrives at such a truth 
and embraces it in all its pain and precariousness. 
If we can agree – for the moment – that Reason is the realm of the 
solitary individual, then there would again seem to be a confluence of 
Bassani and Gellner’s thinking. 
It takes a long time before, if ever, Reason becomes a collective asset, 
and when it does, it can be undermined by social and political forces and 
used for social or political ends. It can end buttressing any one of a 
number of “closed systems” against which Gellner often inveighed. This 
theme of “the collective” and “the solitary” recurs as we know in much of 
Gellner’s writing, as he questions the degree to which either is tenable. 
One can see the roots of his anthropological thinking also in the space he 
devotes in much of his writing to ritual and how these and other 
 
 40 
manifestations of the collective help to bring about a conceptual 
conformity. In Bassani this is very much what we are confronted with, the 
collective and the individual at variance with a collective, someone who is 
“stepping outside prejudice and accumulated custom and refashioning the 
world”. And he does so “alone”. 
What is more, is that our io narrante in Gli occhiali is obviously not 
entirely independent and is in effect dealing in effect with multiple 
collectives, or at least two, that of the Fascist state and that of religion. 
Gellner says for example, citing Durkheim: “[…] the ritual then imprints 
the required shared ideas, the collective representations, on this malleable 
proto-social human matter. It thereby makes it concept bound, constrained 
and socially clubbable” (1992:36). In other words, our io narrante in both 
novels is at once forged by his environment and through the situation he 
faces, emerges cognisant of the ethical dimension of his life and the 
choices he is faced with. 
Radcliff-Umstead points out that language itself becomes part of the 
signifier of a collective, of a ritual, of a defence mechanism against an 
intrusive and uncomprehending society. While Radcliff-Umstead makes 
the observation specifically with reference to Il giardino dei Finzi Contini, 
it applies in comparable measure to Gli occhiali d’oro. Frequent use of 
dialect, and of a frame of reference that is deemed to be understandable to 
only to those familiar with Ferrara and its locales and street names. All of 
this adds to a sense of enclosure, to a sense of exclusivity and a 
knowledge that being understood fully is only possible to those who have 
lived through those times and in that milieu. However, Bassani evokes a 
particular era and mood so intimately, that his works acquire their 
universality and are accessible to us who didn’t live in Ferrara in 1938 or 
1943, for example. What Gellner calls here the “imprint of shared ideas”, 
“the collective representations” and what is “socially clubbable” all 
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pertain to Bassani’s world – Ferrara becomes a collective representation, 
the “shared ideas” are the more liberal Risorgimento values and the 
“socially clubbable” is the adherence to the Jewish community of Ferrara, 
or the adherence to a set of values that resist the Fascist state. In short, we 
are dealing with a set of people who see themselves as free thinkers, who 
aspire to be at say at the apex of modernity, who see themselves as 
cognitively free individuals yet bound by an ancient religious tradition 
threatened by retrogressive forces that seek a return to a society that 
suppresses cognitive freedom and seeks to make them subservient to a 
transient totalitarianism. In short, they see themselves in opposition to the 
rebellion against liberal modernity. Gellner makes reference to 
Durkheim’s assertion that “[…] in religion, society unwittingly worships 
itself, par divinités interposes” (1992: 37). 
Bassani’s Ferrara is a microcosm, intentionally, of exactly that, with 
the added problem that there are competing forces that demand allegiance, 
namely the Jewish religion, the Catholicism of the majority and the 
Fascist state. Before the war, with Catholicism and Fascism in a tenuous 
political alliance of sorts, it only leaves the Jews and the secular, non-
fascist elements of society in a situation of open antagonism with the 
state. If we substitute the word religion with Fascism, the situation Gellner 
describes becomes even clearer, the state encouraging society to worship 
itself, in a kind of national narcissism as long as it is controlled by the 
state, clearly a situation antithetical to the aspirations of those who see 
themselves as free thinkers imbued with the spirit of rationality. And it is 
through these rapids that our io narrante has to navigate, has to distil his 
own moral order, amid all the forces vying for his allegiance. Gellner goes 




[…] but it is far less interesting and important than the view 
that what makes us human and social is our capacity to be 
constrained by compulsive concepts, and the theory that the 
compulsion is instilled by ritual, and that ritual is the core of 
religion. In this sense it was religion, and religion alone, that 
made us human. I do not know whether this theory is true, 
and I doubt whether anyone else knows either: but the 
question to which it offers an answer is a very real and 
serious one. No better theory is available to answer it. No 
other theory highlights the problem so well... Collective 
rituals inculcate shared compulsions thereby quite literally 
humanizing us. We cooperate because we think alike, and we 
think alike thanks to ritual. Durkeim’s version of the Social 
Contract has the merit of not being circular. It does not 
assume rationality and social obligation among those who set 
up the social order. It shows how those who lack either can 
be induced to acquire it. In this way, rituals make society 
possible, and in this way, they also make us human. This is 
the core of Durkheim’s theory. (1992:37) 
 
Whether we agree with Durkheim, or Gellner’s reading of Durkheim, is 
less at issue than their applicability to the situation our io narrante finds 
himself in either Il giardino or Gli occhiali. 
We see how in Bassani that social contract is disrupted and 
undermined and how intimately the manifestations of rupture impinge 
upon his characters. Hence, as mentioned before we see how the sanctity 
of objects, those death defying extensions of ritual are nurtured in the 
Finzi-Contini household; The collective rituals, especially the Jewish ones 
referred to in Il giardino, form what Venturi calls “la modernità nella 
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continuità”4. In a sense Venturi has captured the essence of the Bassani 
text: ritual thus forms part of a mechanism to cope with and to navigate 
through the troubled and anguished times the io narrante has to face, 
times that require him to rely on a faith in Reason, on a truth that is 
arrived at independently by applying rational, empirical faculties, not 
subservient to autocracy or unexamined ritual. 
Also arising out of this search for truth is a defiance in Bassani, as 
many writers have pointed out. One could even say that as far as Gli 
occhiali is concerned arguably the epiphany of the novel is when the io 
narrante says, speaking of Fadigati: “Anziché associarmi a chi lo tradiva 
e lo sfruttava, avevo saputo resistere, conservargli un minimo di rispetto” 
(1980:71). This is a crucial sentence in the novel because it marks the 
triumph of the individual asserting a moral authority, to himself, in 
defiance of the ritualised norms of the state, but not insensible to the 
tenets of his predominantly secularly ethical upbringing. The sentence 
represents that very continuity in modernity, of an ethical view of the 
world, that in turn relies on ritual, transmitted knowledge and language, 
themes keen to Gellner’s investigations. The ontological implications are 
even more succinctly captured when Fadigati says to the io narrante: 
“Accettare di essere quello che sono? O meglio adattarsi ad essere quello 
che gli altri vogliono che io sia?” (1980:100). 
What we see here is in effect someone addressing the implications of 
their existence in a given situation, and the demands this makes on 
cognition, their sense of self, rendered all the more poignant in that 
coming to terms the full implications of existence cannot but lead to a 
profound sense of despair. It is this despair, articulated by Fadigati, that 
                                                 
4  G. Venturi, “Dimenticare Euridice” in Ritorno al Giardino – Una Giornata di Studi per Giorgio 
Bassani, eds. A. Dolfi & G. Venturi, Rome, Bulzoni Editore, 2006. 
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the io narrante refutes, and which shapes his defiance. He will not be 
party to his own destruction. His fellow Ferraresi are not confronted by 
the same choices, choosing instead conformity to adversity. It is in this 
sense that the io narrante in Gli occhiali can be viewed as a type of icon 
of modernity, of the atomistic view of the world, “the loneliness of the 
long-distance rationalist”. 
The io narrante wants to be what he is, what he feels he has a right to 
be and that includes adherence to the proud history of his Jewish Ferrarese 
forebears, that includes the italianità which he feels is his as much as it is 
that of any other fellow Ferrarese. We see this sense of “modernità nella 
continuità” assert itself in other ways too in the adherence to the liberal, 
patriotic tradition. We have seen how in Gellnerian terms the io narrante 
represents a kind of apex of individuality and who happens to represent 
the highest ideals of a united Italy. Fascism was the negation of all that. 
Cristina della Coletta points out that the noted historian, Luigi Salvatorelli 
referred to the Fascist period as “l’Anti-risorgimento”, and this term 
neatly encapsulates our io narrante’s stance as well. She goes into much 
greater detail on this topic and illustrates how the frequent references to 
Carducci in Il giardino for example allude nostalgically to an Italy 
unsullied by Fascism and its vulgar populism: 
 
I segnali intertestuali e le icone letterarie riconducibili al 
tempo dell’histoire (1932-1944) hanno importanza storico-
documentaria poiché, nel seguire il processo involutivo che 
vide la capitolazione dell’ideologia liberale al fascismo, ne 
testimoniano anche la tenace resistenza, ergendosi ad 
emblema della ribellione al programma di politico-culturale 
fascista, ai valori e ai miti promulgati dal regime fondata 
sulla difesa dei principi dell’indipendenza e della libertà 
individuali, sugli ideali filosofico-etici della “verità” e della 
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“bellezza”, la cultura del giardino si oppone alle 
strumentalizzazioni culturali del regime, ai suoi espedienti 
ideologici, e agli orrori dei campi di battaglia. (1998:138-
163) 
 
We see how Bassani conforms in a myriad ways to the quintessential 
liberal ideology and its triumph in modernity, (as opposed to the Positivist 
incarnation of Fascism as Croce describes it), which excites Gellner’s 
mind so and of which he was a champion. However, what makes Bassani 
so useful, is that in his novels – and one is only limiting oneself to two – 
is that many of the forces of anti-liberalism, of the anti-Risorgimento, of 
anti-Empiricism are arraigned against the protagonists, to say nothing of 
his delicate treatment of love, as we have it in Il giardino, the evanescence 
of love and life itself, and the surrender to art and the ideal, when the real 
becomes untenable, as exemplified in Celestino’s relationship to Micòl, 
which in turn is rendered untenable by the awareness of the impending 
doom awaiting Ferrara’s Jews. 
Della Coletta goes on to quote from Salvatorelli and Renzo de Felice: 
 
La diserzione della monarchia nel momento in cui avrebbe 
potuto difendere le istituzioni liberali, sommata alla chiamata 
al potere di Mussolini nell’ottobre del 1922, all’appoggio 
incondizionato offertogli dopo il delitto Matteotti, e in 
seguito all’acquiescenza nei confronti della politica 
antisemita del regime, la rese complice di tutti “gli 
svolgimenti anticostituzionali, anti-liberali e anti-
risorgimentali del fascismo, e responsabile del rinnegamento 





Furthermore, Bassani also can be seen in light of the tradition, if one 
wants to call it that, of Italian Jewish writing’s rich panoply which 
includes as we know Svevo, Moravia, Ginzburg Carlo and Primo Levi and 
of course Bassani. It is in Bassani that the tragedy of the history of Anti-
Semitism in Italy has its most ironic twist, in that: 
 
Leaping to the forefront of Fascism’s supporters, Ferrara’s 
Jewish land-owning elite stood at the opposite pole from 
Turin’s intellectual opposition to Fascism. 
 The laws of October 1938, therefore, were a stunning 
blow to Ferrara’s Jews. The coup de grace, undoubtedly, was 
the destruction of the Scuola Tedesca, and Ashkenazi 
synagogue in 1941. Thoroughly disillusioned, Ferrara’s Jews 
felt utterly betrayed by a movement which they had 
wholeheartedly embraced and supported only a few years 
earlier. […] Bassani plumbed the depths of betrayal and 
ostracism, the motor forces of his characteristic expression of 
nostalgia. […] Professor Finzi-Contini symbolizes the 
spiritual universe beyond assimilation. (Pedatella, 1987:167-
174) 
 
A further example of how a Gellnerian reading of Bassani is useful is 
when we look again at Language & Solitude where Gellner says: “The 
individualism remains prominent and basic: the basic model is that of an 
individual facing his data and constructing a world from them in light of 
and under the guidance of principles which he finds within himself” 
(1998:15-16). Here Bassani’s io narrante and Gellner dovetail perfectly.  
Bassani’s io narrante: “[…] sifts out the impurities introduced into his 




 Synthesising Kant and Hume Gellner concludes that “Ordnung”, 
human universality rather than cultural specificity is the key to a moral 
approach to the world. Again we see how this operates in Bassani. The io 
narrante seeks to find an “impartiality and a symmetry”, (Gellner, 
1998:17)5 to use Gellner’s words, in a world and milieu where symmetry 
has been lost, where the moral and social are out of kilter with the 
principles of civil co-habitation and specifically in a society such as 
Ferrara of the 1930s, where the citizenry harbour claims of adhering to 
civilised norms, as long as those norms exclude homosexuals and Jews. 
 Gellner’s observations relate to his investigation of the theory of 
knowledge and while he is sceptical of the notion that impartiality can 
really exist, what is pertinent in Bassani’s portrayals is the blend of 
culturally specific values combined with a rationality as something to be 
aspired to. The io narrante does discriminate, and does not adhere to the 
moral relativism, Gellner’s bête noir, caught as Bassani’s protagonists are 
between Gellner’s atomistic vs. organic view of the world. 
 
Further observations and area of investigation: Postmodernism, 
Gellner and Bassani 
 
Gellner is highly critical of Postmodernism, and sees it merely as an 
adjunct to, a derivation of, moral relativity. He says for example, opening 
the discussion widely into the realm of philosophy that: 
 
[…] the arguments between the universalistic liberals and the 
romantic rightists is an argument about the very nature of 
man… we find ourselves in a remarkable situation in which 
                                                 
5  “So impartiality and symmetry, Ordnung, hence human universality rather than cultural 
specificity, is the basic message” (Gellner, 1998:17). 
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the political stakes of philosophical visions are very great. 
[…] Community is sung and praised by those who have lost 
it. (1998:20-21) 
 
As mentioned, Gellner goes on to make the distinction between a 
“universalistic-atomistic” and a  “romantic-organic” vision of the world. 
He sees these as the two great rivals of the modern era and attributes this 
polarity to the rise of nationalism. Gellner’s observations thus also allude 
to a further decipherment of Bassani’s text, namely that an individual 
brought up in the “universalistic-atomistic” tradition can only be in 
conflict with the “organic-romantic vision of the world, that implicitly 
excludes those elements that are not integral to a specific ethnically-based 
culture or view of the world. In the case of Bassani, we have our 
“universalistic-atomistic” individual having to live his life in a milieu that 
is essentially “organic-romantic”, even though Fascism went to great 
lengths to promote itself as modern. Fascism can thus also be seen as the 
“romantic-organic” acquiring some of the traits and aspirations of being 
“universalistic-atomistic”. Because it is ultimately incapable of pulling off 
this ruse, Fascism collapses under its own contradictions, not without 
leaving a tragic legacy. It is this legacy which Bassani has articulated 
again by using his protagonists as the vehicle for what one could term his 
“empirical poetic style”. 
Our character of course sees through the mendacity of Fascism and the 
supposed claims it makes on universalism, within a nationalist context. Or 
as Gellner would put it – the absolute is used as an idiom for perpetuating 
a specific tradition. In Bassani’s case it is the absolutism of the state vs. 
the absolutism of his religion and his Enlightenment view of the world. 
In this sense too, paradoxically, Bassani’s protagonists reflect the 
Fascist state, caught as it is between claiming to be the continuation of 
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ancient Rome, while being seeing itself at the forefront of modernity. (We 
know how much Fascism drew much of its visual rhetoric from the 
Futurists.) The parallels between the io narrante and the Fascist state 
itself lie in the “continuità nella modernità”; both the protagonist and his 
historical situation reflect each other, with the difference being that 
Jewishness is what lies at the foundation of the protagonist’s sense of 
continuity, whereas for the Fascist state it is “romanità”. 
False consolation Gellner, would aver, is to be found in a 
Postmodernist view of the world. The question then arises, having read 
Bassani through Gellner’s eyes, can a Postmodernist approach really help 
us to unlock and indeed amplify Bassani’s “text”?  The key to Gellner’s 
critique of Postmodernism is that besides it being merely reliant on 
relativism, it is “a kind of hysteria of subjectivity” (Gellner, PPR 
1992:29). 
While Gellner has much to say about Postmodernism, and it is not the 
aim here to tackle Postmodernism per sé, what Gellner has to say is useful 
for our purposes: 
 
Truth is elusive, polymorphous, inward, subjective… and 
perhaps a few further things as well. Straightforward it is not. 
My real concern is with relativism [author’s italics]: the 
postmodernist movement, which is an ephemeral cultural 
fashion, is of interest as a living and contemporary specimen 
of relativism, which as such is of some importance and will 
remain with us for a long time. (PPR, 1992:24) 
 
Neither Gellner nor Bassani are satisfied with cognitive relativism and 
any consequent paralysis that would ultimately lead to ethical 
indifference. Bassani’s novels, and in particular the two under discussion, 
would seem to defy a postmodernist reading, were such an analysis to lead 
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to the relinquishing of absolute notions of right and wrong. As 
Buchowsky points out: 
 
Gellnerian rationalism shares with Religious 
Fundamentalism the ‘belief in the existence of a unique truth’ 
(PRR:84). Unlike religious dogmatic ideology, however, it 
does not make exceptions for any concept. Rationalist 
empirical method is symmetrically applied to every issue, 
and the content of each belief should be rationally assessed. 
The only absolute value is the formal principle of the 
scrutinization of everything. Rationalist Fundamentalism 
does not accept the relativistic idea that there can be many 
truths and standards of rationality as can be determined by 
‘different life forms’. However, paradoxically, along with 
relativism it does not permit the accessibility of ultimate 
knowledge.[…] Postmodernist discernments can be valuable 
in art and entertainment but not in substantial aspects of our 
life. Serious knowledge is not subject to relativism, but the 
trappings of our life are.” (PRR:95) (2003:34) (13)  
 
Expiation for the sins of colonialism, (if that is as Gellner suggests, the 
psychological basis of Postmodernism) has little to do with the ethical and 
physical dilemmas that Bassani’s characters face. (One could of course 
build up an argument to draw parallels.) Like Gellner, Bassani’s 
characters have to navigate the solitary road of truth, relying on what they 
observe and how that world is filtered into their consciousness. There’s no 
“cosy habitat” to protect them from the state and society’s ulterior motives 
and expediency. 
If one were to counter the notion of the acquisition of “truth” as being 
an essentially solitary activity, we could soon find ourselves in the realm 
of relativity, with each individual living their own truth, as per Pirandello, 
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for example and the precedent he set for much of modern thought. By 
contrast, and to contextualise briefly Bassani and Gellner,  they do tend 
towards upholding a belief  “that there is a unique truth”, which is simply 
unattainable by any given society, indefinitely. Neither pretends to plumb 
the depths of existence beyond a certain point by claiming that truth is 
relative. But as for being an aid to reading a text we find Gellner can give 
us many useful pointers or markers on our way. 
It thus behoves us to take to heart Gellner’s idea that enlightenment 
rationalism upholds the idea that there is a unique truth, and while he 
denies that any society can ever possess it definitively, in Gli occhiali and 
in Il giardino we have protagonists that live this impasse, of two views of 
knowledge, the “atomistic” and the “organic”. 
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